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 "I want to be somebody. I am somebody." This uncertain 
feeling toward the "self" is expressed by one of the drag 
performers in the film Paris Is Burning  (1991). It is a 
documentary film about the drag balls in Harlem, where a 
number of men, either African-American or Latino, compete with 
each other through their performances, dressing and acting 
under categories such as "executive" or "model." The enthusiasm 
of both the performers and the audience in the balls immediately 
strikes, us, the viewers; the film appalls us — it may even disgust 
us. Indeed, confronted with these performers, all of whom are 
ethnic minorities and financially disadvantaged, we cannot help 
projecting onto them an ethnographical gaze; that is, by creating 
a boundary between their world and our own, between their 
reality and our own, we secure our sense of self. Nevertheless, 
a moment's reflection makes us wonder whether we can really 
look at them as the Other. Threatening as it may be, there seems 
to be a room for a question: Isn't there a way in which we identify 
ourselves with these performers in the present cultural condition, 
in which the notion of self has been damaged, in which the 
idea of the individual has been blurred, in which the question 
of who we are presents the greatest perplexity of all. In short, 
the ways in which we talk about the "self' are, on the one hand, 
multiplied, but, on the other hand, obscured. 
 What is at stake in Paris Is Burning is the concept of 
"subjectivity
," one of the major concerns within Cultural Studies. 
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Various post-structuralist enterprises have elaborated the concept 
of subjectivity in order to theorize a subject being who is 
constituted in and by the social forces which surround him. As 
opposed to the humanistic idea of the autonomous individual who 
possesses the determining force over the course of his life, this 
post-structuralist subject is destabilized and susceptible to the 
transformation required of him by the power relations in which 
he lives. John Fiske explains the ambiguity of this concept as 
follows: 
     This is not to deny that we are all individuals, that is, 
     that we inhabit different bodies with different and unique 
      genetic structures, but it is to say that that part of us 
      which forms our individuality is essentially biological, 
      part of nature, and does not, therefore, form a major 
      part of the study of culture. What cultural studies are 
      concerned with, of course, is the sense that various 
      cultures make of "the individual," and the sense of self 
      that we, as individuals, experience. This constructed 
      sense of the individual in a net work of social relations 
 is what is referred to as "the  subject"(48). 
In the above conception, what constitutes a subject, the 
relationship between an individual and a network of social forces 
to which he is subjected, is by no means simple and clear. 
Responding directly to Paris is Burning, Judith Butler argues 
that the film is "about simultaneous production and subjugation 
of subject" (Bodies That Matter 124). Furthermore, by examining 
the performativity of these drags, Butler presents the notion of 
"performance" as a mode of resistance, as a means to expose 
the naturalized hegemonic cultural and social power networks 
in which gender identity is constructed. In this paper, I would 
like to examine the process by which an individual becomes a 
subject as it has been presented by three different cultural 
theorists: Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler. 
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Finally I would like to return to the question of "performativity" 
and self presented by the film in an effort to pose the following 
question: To what extent do the performances of the drags in 
the film reflect our state of  being  ? 
 Louis Althusser has developed the notion of subjectivity 
according to a relatively traditional line of Marxism. In his 
essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus," he approaches 
the issue of subjectivity through the social structure which is 
constructed according to the principles of the capitalist system. 
At the outset of his essay, he repeats the crucial question in 
Marxist theory, that is, the question of the reproduction of the 
relations of production. In the course of his examination of 
this question, he rephrases the basic Marxist structural analysis 
of society, namely, the interdependent relation between base 
and superstructure. The base is the economic foundation of 
society shaped by its material productivity, whereas the 
superstructure is social practices and consciousness determined 
by the base.  Althusser suggests that, while this topography of 
social structure is significant insofar as it "reveals that it is the 
base which in the last instance determines the whole  edifice"(8), 
it is necessary to redefine this model "from the point of view 
of reproduction," especially in terms of the reproduction, which 
requires not only "a reproduction of its skills, but also at the 
same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the 
established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling 
ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to 
manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of 
exploitation and  repression"(8). 
 Althusser argues that according to this orthodox Marxist 
notion, in this base-superstructure model of society, the 
reproduction of the relations of production is secured, for the 
most part, by the legal-political and ideological superstructure. 
However, he insists that we should go beyond this simplistic 
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model of social structure, and he suggests that the reproduction 
of the relations of production is secured, for the most part, "by 
the exercise of State power in the State  Apparatus"(22). Here, 
he introduces the new concept of the State Apparatus, that is, 
the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State 
Apparatuses. The Repressive State Apparatus is reminiscent of 
the Marxist notion of the State, which "functions by violence" 
 (17). Such an Apparatus can be found, for instance, in the 
Government, the Army, or the Police, belonging to the public 
domain, and thus, is always singular. On the other hand, the 
Ideological State Apparatuses "function by  ideology"  (19), the 
most of which belong to the private domain, such as the systems 
of religious organizations, the systems of educational institutions, 
or the systems within families. For Althusser, all these 
Ideological State Apparatuses "contribute to the same result: 
the reproduction of the relations of  production"(28). Therefore, 
they present themselves by means of making an individual a 
subject of ideology who submits himself to the established order 
of society. 
 Thus, in  Althusser's notion of subjectivity, it is through 
ideology that an individual becomes a subject. However, his 
definition of ideology distinguishes him from orthodox Marxists. 
For Althusser, ideology is not simply a matter of systems of ideas 
being imposed on an individual by the ruling class or "false 
consciousness," which makes an individual believe that there 
is no paradox between the interests of the working class and 
of the dominant class. Ideology, according to  Althusser, is like 
the "unconscious," having no history and existing eternally, and 
it is not altogether negative, as in the Marxist notion of ideology, 
insofar as it provides an individual with "the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" 
 (36). Ideology, he goes on, "interpellates" the individual as 
subject. The famous example of this interpellation is the 
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policeman's hailing "Hey, you there !" and an individual's 
recognition that it is he who is being hailed. Through this "mere 
one-hundred-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a 
 subject"(48). Furthermore,  Althusser explains that "there is no 
ideology except by the subject and for the subject. Meaning, 
there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this 
destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject 
and its  functioning"(44). In this way, Althusser continues to 
say that "you and I are always already subjects, and as such 
constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which 
guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, 
distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects"  (47). 
Interestingly,  Althusser's account of subjectivity recalls the 
Lacanian notion of the subject as an individual who is subjected 
to the law (the name of the father) upon entering the Symbolic 
stage through the acquisition of language, which enables him 
to distinguish himself from others — "I" from "you"— and thus 
to acquire his identity. In short, while ideology forms the life 
of an individual, making him a subject, it also provides the only 
means for him to perceive the reality he lives in — a means 
for him to make his existence intelligible. 
 The way in which Michel Foucault analyzes subjectivity 
presents a different approach from that of  Althusser in that, while 
 Althusser seems to attempt to create a universal theory of 
subjecthood in which power is assumed to come from a single 
inevitable source, Foucault rejects a deterministic structural 
analysis and avoids the psychoanalytic approach. Foucault, 
instead, tries to reveal the different techniques of power, which 
make themselves defused as well as natural so as to be effective 
in the creation of the subject. He suggests that the power 
which is exercised on the body of an individual should be 
"conceived not  as a property
, but as a strategy," and he continues 
that: 
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      Its effects of domination are attributed not to 
 `appropriation
,' but to dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, 
      techniques, functioning; that one should decipher in it 
      a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, 
      rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one 
     should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than 
      a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a 
     territory. (Discipline & Punish 26) 
Nevertheless, Foucault shares much with  Althusser, especially 
in his notion of the reciprocal relationship between power and 
the individual; that is, for him power not only subjugates an 
individual but also affirms the individual's own being. In other 
words, it is power that creates an individual in the first place. 
He explains that it is through the subjugation by power that 
the body of the individual becomes a socially "useful force." 
In this way, "this power is not exercised simply as an obligation 
or prohibition on those who  'do not have it'; it invests them, is 
transmitted by them and through  them"(27). To illustrate his 
notion of power, Foucault studies local and specific tactics of 
power operations through which an individual being is naturally 
and inevitably caught up in the micro-network of power relations. 
  In Discipline & Punish, Foucault approaches the concept of 
subjectivity through a genealogical analysis of judicial practices. 
He suggests that there have been three modes of power 
developed since the eighteenth-century: the absolutist, the 
rationalist, and the disciplinary. The absolutist mode depended 
on theatrical executions, in which a criminal, whose illegal act 
was always conceived of as an offense against the king, was 
punished through public physical tortures so that the rest of 
the society would recognize the absolute power of the sovereign. 
However, under the influence of reformers, this torturous aspect 
of punishment eventually disappeared, and the mode of rationalist 
power came to be exercised as a more "humane" way. At this 
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point, the question was no longer simply "who committed it" 
but: "How can we assign the causal process that produced  it  ? 
Where did it originate in the author  himself  ? Instinct, 
unconscious, environment, hereditary ?" The work of the judge 
became "judging something other than crimes, namely, the  'soul' 
of the  criminal"(19). In this shift, "knowledge" came to play a 
major role within the penal system; that is, "knowledge of the 
offence, knowledge of the offender, knowledge of the law," which 
made it possible to create "truth" within the power operation, 
according to which a criminal was examined not only by "what 
they do" but also by "what they  are"(18). In this mode of 
power, a criminal became a "sign" of illegality or abnormality, 
whose circulation in society reinforces the idea of justice under 
the law. 
 The operation of the disciplinary mode of power depends on 
the knowledge of human beings, which is based on  "truth" 
developed within the penal system. Its concern is no longer with 
how to punish a criminal or how to define him, but with how 
to produce "a productive body and a subjugated body" out of 
him  (26). Foucault argues that this mechanism of power also 
operates within various social  institutions, which echoes 
 Althusser's notion of the Ideological State Apparatus. One such 
institution is the military, in which a soldier is controlled and 
trained on his military performance in a microscopic way  — 
how he is supposed to walk and how he is supposed to hold a 
rifle as an ideal soldier. Another example is the school, especially 
its system of examinations, in that a student is taught in order 
to meet "the norm" created by the pedagogical system so as to 
become a good student. Foucault argues that this technique 
of power also operates in a more subtle and effective way. Here, 
he introduces Bentham's notion of Panopticon, the special 
architectural design which allows for a controlling tower to be 
placed in the center of a prison to observe the inside of each 
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room of the surrounding buildings without making itself visible. 
The significance of this mechanism is that this controlling tower 
can supervise the inmate without imposing on him direct force; 
it is "to induce in the inmate a state of consciousness and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
 power"(201). Therefore, it creates and sustains "a power relation 
independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the 
inmate should be caught up in a power situation of which they 
are themselves the  bearers"  (201). Foucault argues that modern 
society shares these features of the panopticon insofar as it is 
through one's own consciousness that one is constantly and 
permanently observed and controlled, thereby becoming a subject 
of his own. 
 In examining the discourse of sexuality, Foucault elaborates 
this account of the mechanisms of disciplinary power, the notion 
of a subject through the self-application of power. In The History 
of Sexuality, he argues that the repressive model of sexuality 
of the Victorian regime, in which sex was considered to be 
something hidden, thus associated with a sense of guilt, a sin, 
has created the discourse of sexuality, in which "power and 
knowledge are joined  together"(100). Under this discourse, 
power operates as a confessional model in which one feels 
compelled to talk about his own sexuality. Foucault suggests 
that this mode of power not only proliferates the knowledge of 
human sexuality, but also produces "truth" — sex comes to be 
understood as the essence of one's being. Thus, Foucault 
explains that "it is through sex - in fact, an imaginary point 
determined by the deployment of sexuality - that each individual 
has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility 
(seeing that it is both the hidden aspect and the generative 
principle of meaning), to the whole of his body"— to his identity 
 (155). In this way, he suggests that "homosexual becomes a 
 personage"(43). Moreover, because of the medical intervention 
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which associates certain illnesses with abnormal sexuality, and 
the political intervention which is concerned with the control 
of population, this discourse comes to present itself as "bio-
power," creating "the norm" of sexuality so as to confirm that 
society maintains its functioning operations. Thus, Foucault 
suggests that the discourse of sexuality shares characteristics 
with the mode of disciplinary power in that an individual is 
made to feel compelled to talk about his sexuality and is 
constantly controlled and regulated according to his sexuality. 
In short, it is through one's consciousness, that is, self-application 
of power, that one regulates one's sexuality, thus creating an 
identity. 
 Although Judith Butler's account of subjectivity is confined 
to the discussion of gender identity, she develops her argument 
along the lines of those of  Althusser and Foucault in that she 
reworks their accounts of subjectivity by combining their 
approaches despite the differences they present. As in Foucault's 
account of subjectivity, Butler presupposes that insofar as "gender 
is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different 
historical contexts," it is "impossible to separate out  'gender' from 
the political and cultural intersection in which it is invariably 
produced and maintained" (Gender Trouble 3). Much as Foucault 
argues against the repressive model of sex, which has created 
the discourse of sexuality, Butler, by examining the contemporary 
discourse of feminism, argues against the expressive model that 
the discourse is problematically caught up in. In this model, 
some feminist theories assume that there is a silent substance 
within a woman which is repressed, and thus not recognized, 
within a patriarchal social system. By invoking Foucault's 
account of the discourse of sexuality, Butler argues that feminist 
discourse creates the object of its investigation; that is to say, 
despite its effort to undo the patriarchal social system in which 
women are subjugated, by making theories about women, the 
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discourse itself has ironically created the universal category of 
"woman" to which all women come to be subjected. Thus, she 
suggests that insofar as there "is no gender identity behind the 
very  'expressions' that are said to be its  results"(25), the "feminist 
critique ought to explore the totalizing concept of a masculinist 
signifying economy, but also remain self-critical with respect to 
the totalizing gestures of  feminism"(13). 
 Butler particularly opposes the distinction between sex and 
gender that feminist theories presuppose; that is, that sex is 
fundamentally a biological principle, whereas gender is a 
reflection of social norms. For Butler, this distinction is 
inappropriate insofar as it is based on the faulty Cartesian notion 
of the duality between mind and body in which mind is assumed 
to possess certain prestigious freedom over body. At this point 
in her argument, she reworks Foucault's account of the discourse 
of sexuality by suggesting that sex is also culturally constructed, 
not  "'a cause' of sexual experience, behavior and desire," but 
rather  "'an effect,' the production of a given regime of sexuality 
that seeks to regulate sexual experience by instating the discreet 
categories of sex as foundational and causal functions within 
any discursive account of  sexuality"(23). By taking this notion 
of the arbitrary relationship between "cause" and "effect" into 
account, she argues that it is the gendered body that the social 
and cultural discursive practices seek to regulate and control, 
and thereby turn into a subject. Here, she introduces her notion 
of gender as performance by suggesting that gender  identity is 
"a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame 
that congeals over time to produce the appearance of substance, 
of a natural sort of  being"(33). She explains as follows: 
      Gender ought not to be constructed as a stable identity 
      or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather 
      gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, 
      instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition 
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     of acts. The effect of gender is produced through the 
      stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood 
      as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, 
      movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the 
     illusion of an abiding gendered  self"  (140). 
Referring to Nietzche's claim in On the Geneology of Morals that 
"there is no  'being' behind the doing
, effecting, becoming;  'the 
doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed — the deed is 
everything," Butler argues that there "is no gender identity 
behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively 
constituted by the very  "expressions" that are said to be its 
 results"(25). In short, she argues that it is not a doer who 
determines the deed, but it is the deed, one's performance, which 
constructs the doer. 
 Butler's notion of gender identity as performance shares a 
fundamental assumption with Foucault's notion of disciplinary 
power insofar as both argue that it is the body onto which 
external power is applied in order to control an individual and 
to create a subject out of him — the body becomes an inscription 
of power which is always open to resignification. However, 
Butler's notion of a parodic repetitive act makes her notion of 
subjectivity distinct; that is, while Foucault's account of 
disciplinary power seems not to leave any room for resistance 
because of his notion of a special technique of power through 
which one becomes a subject by self-application of power, Butler's 
notion of gender as performance, which is reinforced by her 
discussion of "drag" performers, presents itself as a mode of 
resistance. By examining the ambiguity of "drag" performance, 
she argues that the discontinuity between the gender identity 
of "drag" performers and the gender identity that they perform 
exposes the constructed nature of gender identity so that "in 
the place of the law of heterosexual coherence, we see sex and 
gender denaturalized by means of performance which avows their 
                      75
distinctness and dramatized the cultural mechanism of their 
fabricated  unity"(138). Furthermore, with this assumption, she 
reworks  Althusser's notion of the interpelleted subject by 
directing our attention to "bad subjects" who might refuse to 
recognize the interpellation of the law. What Butler suggests 
is that  Althusser's notion does not allow for the possibility that 
the refusal could be the very production of the law itself. Thus, 
she suggests that the interpellation is not formative, but rather 
"performative
," and the question here is not whether one can 
escape from the law, but how one performs within this law so 
as to redefine and reshape its effects. 
 By reworking Foucault's and  Althusser's notions of subjectivity, 
it seems that Butler's notion of performance can go beyond the 
discussion of gender identity; that is, it can be conceived as a 
mode of resistance against the discursive practices to which we 
all are subjected - whether it is ideology, disciplinary power, or 
the discourse of sexuality. However, it seems necessary to 
emphasize that this mode of resistance does not present a way 
out; it merely exposes the strategies of social and cultural 
discourses which present themselves as natural so as to weaken 
it. Thus, Butler suggests that "drag is a site of a certain 
ambivalence, one which reflects the more general situation of 
being implicated in the regimes of power by which one is 
constituted and, hence, of being implicated in the very regimes 
of power that one opposes" (Bodies That Matter  125). In this 
way, she argues that the film "Paris Is Burning documents neither 
an efficacious insurrection nor painful resubordination, but 
unstable coexistence of both"  (137). In the drag balls, "realness" 
is the underlying major principle by which the performers are 
judged. The juxtaposition of the "realness" that they perform 
and the scenes from the real life of ordinary people that the 
film presents makes us wonder whether we can make any 
distinctions between these realities. In other words, seeing the 
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competition as performativity of "the norm," which is implicated 
in reality, we are given a sense that that is what we are left 
with in talking about the "self." In this way, the feeling of "I 
want to be somebody. I am somebody" no longer echoes away 
from us. 
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